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Abstract
A considerable amount of academic research on
crowdfunding has highlighted the importance of online
social networks to crowdfunding success. Despite
findings from these early studies, the focus of the extant
literature has been on more persistent state-type ties
such as friendship. In the current research, we examine
how borrower-partner and borrower-team event-type
ties affect lender behavior and loan success in online
peer-to-peer (P2P) lending. Our empirical results using
a multilevel mixed effects model reveal that borrowerteam networks function as pipes that facilitate the flow
of information and prospective lenders while borrowerpartner ties function as prisms that signal borrowers’
pressing financial need. Our results highlight the
importance of establishing lending teams on
crowdfunding platforms to enhance lender contribution.

1. Introduction
Over the last decade, crowdfunding has become a
popular mechanism through which individuals and
business can obtain donations for significant life
changing events such as medical treatments and
education, borrow money from other lenders, and
bypass investors and the financial markets to obtain
funds to support their start-up activities and continued
growth. Among the different crowdfunding business
models, online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending that allows
individuals to lend and borrow money from each other
has taken center stage. Research on P2P lending has
examined how borrowers’ project descriptions, category
spanning and lenders’ herding behavior affect
fundraising success [1-3].
The extant crowdfunding literature highlights the
importance of social capital and social networks to
fundraising success across multiple crowdfunding
business models [4-7]. Despite the significance of such
social capital and social networks, there exists two gaps
in research. First, current studies have focused on state-
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type social networks of more permanent relationships
such as friendship [8]. Few have examined the impacts
of event-type social networks that arise due to business
transactions. To the best of our knowledge, the only
exceptions are Colombo et al. [7] and Wang et al. [9]
where they examine social capital and social networks
emerged due to transactions on crowdfunding
platforms. Second, no research except for Liu et al. [4]
has examined the different mechanisms through which
social networks affect lender behavior.
In the current study, we examine different types of
social networks on Kiva.org, a leading P2P lending
website, where organizations called field partners can
review loan applications from borrowers and then post
approved applications on Kiva. This process creates a
tie between the borrower and the field partner that is
specific to the particular loan transaction. In addition,
lenders on Kiva can form lending teams based on shared
interest, geography, or school and employer affiliation,
and lenders from the same team can share information
on the loans they have contributed to. Each loan’s
fundraising page also displays its lending teams. This
creates a second event-based tie between the
borrower(s) and a lending team. In the current study, we
investigate how these two event-type social ties function
differently as either signals of loan quality or channels
through which prospective lenders learn about a loan.
Results from our empirical research using a multilevel
mixed effects model reveal that indeed these two types
of social networks affect lender decision making and
crowdfunding success differently. Specifically, ties
between borrowers and their contributing teams
function as pipes that raise awareness about a particular
loan and facilitate the flow of prospective lenders to a
loan’s page. As a result, borrowers with more
contributing teams receive more funding in the next
period. In contrast, ties between borrowers and their
field partners are prisms that convey information about
the borrowers’ financial need, and borrowers with a
higher risk field partner are perceived more favorably
by Kiva lenders and receive more contribution. Our
results highlight the altruistic motivation behind Kiva
lenders’ decisions as they do not receive any interest rate
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on their loans to the borrowers and face the risk of not
being able to obtain repayment on their loans. These
results have implications to both P2P lending platforms
and donation-based crowdfunding websites such as
GoFundMe where crowdfunding participants donate to
others in need for altruistic purposes.

2. Literature Review
2.1. Crowdfunding
Academic research on crowdfunding has examined
factors that affect crowdfunding success at both the
platform and the project levels. At the platform level,
Jiang et al. [10] identified investors’ herding behavior in
their choice of crowdfunding platforms and revealed
how such behaviors are moderated by the platform’s
market share, cumulative amount funded, and time in
operation. The majority of the crowdfunding research
focuses on the project level, where researchers have
examined how characteristics of the borrowers and
projects, similarity between the borrowers and lenders,
group leader behavior and social networks affect project
performance [2, 3, 5, 6, 11-14].
In P2P lending, because of the information
asymmetry between the participants, borrowers and
lenders often use signals to indicate and infer loan
quality and make lending decisions. For example,
project narratives that signal autonomy, competitive
aggressiveness and risk-taking lead to more funding
success while language that signals conscientiousness,
courage, empathy and warmth are less favored by
lenders [15]. In addition, lenders exhibit rational herding
and infer signals of poor borrower quality as better
creditworthiness while signals of high borrower quality
are discounted [2]. However, lenders may also mistake
group leaders’ bids as signals of a high loan quality [3].
The extant crowdfunding literature also reveals the
importance of social capital and social networks to
crowdfunding success. Colombo et al. [7] showed that
borrowers’ internal social capital accumulated within a
crowdfunding platform positively contributes to early
project success and a higher likelihood of reaching the
fundraising goal in rewards-based crowdfunding.
Similarly, external social capital accumulated outside of
the crowdfunding platform through online and offline
friend networks leads to more funds received, a higher
likelihood of reaching the funding goal, and lower
interest rates in P2P lending [4, 5].
Despite the significance of social capital and social
networks, two gaps in the literature exist. First, there is
little research that explores the mechanisms through
which different types of social networks affect lender
behavior and loan success. To the best of our

knowledge, the only exception is Liu et al. [4] that
examined how the borrower’s online and offline friends
networks and the strength of the friendship ties differ in
their impacts on lender decisions. Second, the focus of
the crowdfunding literature has been on friendship
networks of the borrowers or lenders. In the current
study, we examine how the borrower-partner and
borrower-team networks on Kiva, a P2P lending
website, function differently in affecting loan success.

2.2. Social networks as pipes and prisms
Social networks represent the interactions and
connections among individuals, entities and events [8].
Scholars across many disciplines including sociology,
management and political science have used social
network theory (SNT) to examine the formation of ties
among individuals and entities, how the strength of
these ties affect the flow of information and resources in
a network, and how network positions affect individual,
organizational and political performance and outcomes.
Information Systems (IS) researchers have also applied
SNT to the study of open source software development
[16], information technology outsourcing [17], WOM
and diffusion of innovation [18], social media user
behavior [19-21], and crowdfunding [4, 5].
According to SNT, there are two types of ties in
social networks. State-type ties such as kinship ties and
friendship are more persistent, while event-type ties
such as business transactions and committee
membership are based on transactions and social
interactions and are more discrete and transitory [8].
Irrespective of the type, social ties have long been
recognized as valuable because they represent access to
information, ideas and resources that flow in the
network [8]. As a result, the strength of the ties
especially the weak ties and the positions of the nodes
such as structural holes are important determinants of
how information and resources are shared or diffuse
across a network [22, 23].
In a stark contrast to earlier social network research
that views social ties of all types as roads or pipes
through which news or resources flow, Podolny [24]
distinguishes between two types of network ties: those
as pipes and those as prisms. In the former case, network
ties function as pipes through which information and
resources flow, and traditional network theories such as
the strength of weak ties and structural holes apply. In
the latter case, social ties do not facilitate the flow of
information or resources. Rather, they function as
prisms that differentiate the nodes. Hence, being
connected to a higher status alter indicates the social
status of the ego and serves as a signal of trustworthiness
and credibility. For example, in the organizational
context, being associated with a high status organization
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indicates that a firm has obtained the approval of the
more prominent other [25]. As a result, nodes occupying
structural holes are not in an advantageous position.
We apply Podolny’s notion of networks as pipes and
prisms to examine how two crowdfunding event-type
ties - those between a borrower and a field partner and
those between a borrower and a lending team –function
as pipes and prisms in affecting lender behavior and loan
success.

3. Background and Hypotheses
3.1. P2P lending on Kiva
As a leading P2P lending platform, Kiva offers
borrowers from around the world, especially those in
developing countries, the opportunity to obtain loans
from lenders. Most Kiva loans involve a field partner,
very often a microfinance institution that has teamed up
with Kiva to review borrower applications, pre-disburse
loans to approved borrowers, post loans on Kiva, and
collect repayments based on predetermined dates. While
many field partners collect minimal interest on the loans
to cover their operational expenses, the lenders do not
receive interest on their loans. Hence, it is likely that
lenders do not focus on the time value of money and
lend for altruistic reasons under the risk of no
repayment. A loan listing usually lasts up to 30 days or
until the fundraising goal has been If the fundraising
goal is not reached at the end of the listing period, the
lenders get a refund of their contribution.
In addition to lending to borrowers on Kiva, lenders
can also join one or more lending teams formed based
on shared interests and beliefs, geographic proximity, or
organizational or school affiliation. Each team can have
one or more captains that manage team message boards
and activities. As an example, Kiva Christians, one of
the largest lending teams on Kiva, had three captains
and over 21,000 members in May 2018 and has
provided over $45 million in loans since its inception in
2008. On each team’s webpage, team members’ most
recent loan activities are listed with hyperlinks to the
loans. Members can also interact with other team
members on the team’s message board.

3.2. Hypotheses
The involvement of field partners and the presence
of lending teams introduce two event-type networks on
Kiva. First, there is a borrower-partner network when
borrowers apply for Kiva loans through the field
partners. This relationship is based on a particular loan
application and is temporary. Hence, it is an event-type
tie. Similarly, when one or more lenders in a team lend

to the borrower(s) of a loan, a tie is created between the
borrower(s) and the team based on the loan transaction.
The team is listed under the “Contributing teams”
section of the loan page, and members of the team can
view the loan information through a hyperlink posted on
the team’s homepage. This creates a second event-type
borrower-team tie based on the lending transactions. In
the current research, we examine how these two eventtype ties affect prospective lenders’ decision-making
and the amount of fund a loan is able to accumulate.
While both networks are event-type networks, the
mechanisms through which they affect lending behavior
are different. Field partners review borrowers’ loan
applications and post approved loans on Kiva. During
this underwriting and approval process, a field partner
can screen out risky borrowers. However, the process
and criteria field partners use to approve loan
applications are unknown to Kiva lenders. Prospective
lenders can only rely on the information posted on the
loan webpage to infer borrowers’ quality. The field
partner section on a loan’s webpage lists information
and statistics about the field partner including tenure on
Kiva, number of borrowers helped, total amount of
loans raised, overall risk rating, and more specific risk
indicators such as delinquency rate, default rate, and
loans at risk rate. Because prospective lenders do not
have access to all information field partners have on the
borrower(s) or the processes and criteria the field
partner used to screen the borrower(s), field partner
statistics become important prisms that convey
borrower quality information. Hence, being associated
with a more experienced field partner with a longer
tenure, more loans secured for the borrowers, and lower
risks may serve as status signals of the borrower(s)’
credibility and trustworthiness. Prior research suggests
that status signals very often reduce transaction costs,
enhance access to financial capital, and improve
organizational survival [26]. In crowdfunding,
borrowers and lenders have frequently used signals to
infer loan quality due to the uncertainty involved [5, 27].
For Kiva lenders, the borrower-partner tie may serve as
a prism that signals the quality of the borrower(s) and
the likelihood of getting repayment on their loan.
H1a: A loan with a field partner with longer tenure on
Kiva is associated with a higher likelihood of
fundraising success.
H1b: A loan with a field partner that has raised more
loans is associated with a higher likelihood of
fundraising success.
H1c: A loan with a lower-risk field partner is associated
with a higher likelihood of fundraising success.
In contrast to the borrower-partner ties being prisms,
the borrower-team ties are pipes that channel the flow of
prospective lenders for three reasons. First, after one or
more members of a lending team contribute to a loan, a
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hyperlink to the loan is added to the team activity
section on the team’s homepage on Kiva. This alerts
other members of the team about the loan, and they can
click on the loan’s hyperlink to learn about it. Second,
because lending teams are very often formed based on
common lending interests, the likelihood of other team
members contributing to a loan is higher than that of an
average lender. Hence, once other members of the team
become aware of the loan, their likelihood of lending to
the borrowers is much higher than that of a random
lender. Third, lenders can interact with others on the
same team through the team’s message board. This
provides the members another opportunity to raise
awareness about the loans they fund and introduce more
prospective lenders to a listing. The online team forum
also fosters an online community for team members
with similar lending interests. Such an online
community help its members develop a shared identity,
enhance member commitment, and encourage altruistic
behaviors [28]. As a result, borrowers with many
contributing teams, with teams with more members, and
with more active teams based on recent contributions
are likely to receive more funding. Hence, we have:
H2a: A loan with more contributing teams is associated
with a higher likelihood of fundraising success.
H2b: A loan with more members in its contributing
teams is associated with a higher likelihood of
fundraising success.
H2c: A loan with teams that have contributed more
recently is associated with a higher likelihood of
fundraising success.

4. Data and Methods
4.1. Data
We collected weekly loan data through the Kiva API
from March to July 2017 using an automated data
collection agent. Our sample consists of data on 34,771
loans with a total of 81,146 loan-week pairs. Each loan
has up to four weekly observations since Kiva loans last
up to 30 days. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive
statistics on key loan variables at the end of each listing.
Table 1. Loan descriptive statistics (N=34,771)
Variable

Mean

Min

Max

2.04

Std.
Dev.
3.14

# of
borrowers
Amount
raised in USD
# lenders
# teams

1

37

312.05

909.37

0

44475

9.12
6.72

22.84
9.62

0
0

1082
373

4.2. Econometric Models

While there is a screening process by the field
partner prior to the loan being posted on Kiva, this
process is exogenous in our research for three reasons.
First, we focus on prospective lenders’ decisionmaking based on loan, field partner and lending team
information already posted on Kiva and how such
information affects a loan’s fundraising success. The
underwriting process that occurs prior to the loan
posting on Kiva is exogenous to our research. Second,
Kiva is global and its goal is to reduce poverty. The
lenders are from developed countries while the
overwhelming majority of the borrowers are from
developing countries. Hence, the chance of Kiva
lenders having private information on the borrowers is
very low. Third, Kiva lenders do not have access to the
process or criteria field partners use in their
underwriting process. Prospective lenders can only rely
on the information posted on the loan webpage
including field partner statistics and lending teams to
make their lending decisions. Hence, we argue that, in
presence of the unknown underwriting process and
selection criteria used by the field partners, lenders
view field partner statistics as prisms that convey
important information about borrower(s) quality. As a
result, we do not consider the field partner screening
process as an endogeneity concern in our research.
Because we model loan success based on
borrower(s), field partner and lending team data posted
on a loan’s webpage, we recognize that not all loans
received funding and those that received funding did
not all have lenders as members of lending teams. This
introduces a selection bias in our data since we have to
eliminate loans without lending teams, and there may
be a systematic difference between loans with and
without lending teams. To correct for this selection
bias, we first estimate a Heckman [29] selection model
on the likelihood of a loan having at least one lending
team. We use the following model to predict the
probability that a loan had at least one contributing
team by time t:
Pr(HadTeamit=1|zit)=Φ(zitβ1 + μi + vt +εit),
(1)
where HadTeamit is a dummy variable indicating if
Loan i had at least one contributing team by time t, Φ
denotes the standard cumulative normal distribution,
and zit is a vector of exogenous variables on loan
characteristics at time t including the natural logarithm
of the fundraising goal, the borrower count on the loan,
the sector of the loan’s intended use, the borrower(s)’
country, whether the loan had a field partner, and the
number of days left in the loan listing. These variables
are exogenous to the probability of a loan having at least
one lending team because they are either determined
prior to the loan being posted on Kiva or they are based
on time which is not determined by lender behavior. vt
represents the fixed effects of the week of the data
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collection. Because of the bias present in fixed effects
nonlinear models, we estimate a random effects Probit
model [30]. Loan i’s random effect μi follows a N(0,σμ2)
distribution. We calculate the inverse Mills ratio based
on Equation 1 and add it in our second-stage multilevel
mixed effects model as an explanatory variable.
Our second stage model involves estimating the loan
amount a listing received during week t. Because loans
are nested under the field partners, we use a multilevel
(a.k.a hierarchical) mixed-effects model with the loan
being the first level and the field partner being the
second level. The use of the multilevel model allows us
to capture systematic variations in the impacts of loan
and team characteristics among loans sponsored by the
same field partner [31]. In the first level, we estimate the
amount of loan a listing received during week t based on
borrower, loan and team characteristics:
Level 1 (Loanij): Δyijt= β0j + β1jyijt-1 + β2jDaysLeftijt-1 +
β3jln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) + β4jln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1) +
β5jln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) + β6IMRijt-1 + vt +εijt, (2)
where Δyijt represents the natural logarithm of one plus
the amount of loan listing i sponsored by field partner j
received during week t (ln(LoanAmtRcvdijt+1)), yijt-1 is
the natural logarithm of the total amount of loan listing
i with field partner j received up until week t-1 plus one
(ln(TtlAmtRcvdijt-1+1)), IMRijt-1 is the inverse Mills ratio
for listing i at week t-1, and vt is the fixed effects of the
week of the data collection. εijt is the error term in the
prediction of the amount of loan a listing received and
follows a N(0,σε2) distribution. The other variables
represent the impacts of loan and team characteristics on
the amount of loan received. Because the number of

lenders on a loan is highly correlated with the
cumulative amount raised, we do not include the latter
in our loan level model.
Next, we introduce field-partner characteristics in
our Level 2 model to capture their impacts on loan
listing success and how the impacts of lending teams
may differ across loans with different field partners:
Level 2 (Partnerj): β0j = γ00 + γ01ln(PtrTenurejt-1) +
γ02ln(PtrTtlAmtRaisedjt-1) + γ03PtrRatingjt-1 + ξ0j,
β1j= γ10 + ξ1j, β2j= γ20 + ξ2j, β3j= γ30 + ξ3j, β4j= γ40 + ξ4j, and
β5j= γ50 + ξ5j.
(2)
Based on these specifications, the intercept β0j in
Equation 1 is a function of three field partner-related
variables and a random effect ξ0j. The slopes in Equation
1 are dependent on a fixed effect (γ) and a field partnerrelated random effect (ξ). These random effects are
assumed to follow normal distributions with a mean of
zero and their respective variances. By combining
Equations 1 and 2, we have:
Δyijt= γ00 +γ01ln(PtrTenurejt-1) +γ02ln(PtrTtlAmtRaisedjt-1
+1) + γ03PtrRatingjt-1 + γ10yijt-1 + γ20DaysLeftijt-1 +
γ30ln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) + γ40ln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1) +
γ50ln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) + β6IMRijt-1 + vi +εit +
ξ1jyijt-1 + ξ2jDaysLeftijt-1 + ξ3jln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) +
ξ4jln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1) + ξ5jln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1)
+ ξ0j.
(3)
In Equation 3, the γ’s are the fixed effects and the ξ’s
are the random effects. Hence, we have a hierarchical
mixed-effects model and estimate the coefficients for
the fixed effects and the variances of the random effects.
Table 2 summarizes our variable definitions.

Table 2. Variable definitions
Variable
HadTeamit
ln(LoanAmtRcvdijt+1)
ln(TtlAmtRcvdijt-1+1)
ln(LoanGoali+1)
NoBorrowersi
DummyPtri
DaysLeftijt-1
ln(NoTeamsijt-1+1)
ln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1)
ln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1)
ln(PtrTenurejt-1)
ln(PtrTtlAmtRaisedjt-1+1)
PtrRatingjt-1
IMR ijt-1

Definition
1 if loan i had at least one contributing team by time t; 0 otherwise.
The natural logarithm of one plus the contribution amount loan i received during time t.
The natural logarithm of one plus the total contribution amount loan i received up until
time t-1.
The natural logarithm of one plus the fundraising goal of loan i.
The number of borrowers on loan i.
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if loan i had a field partner; 0 otherwise.
The number of fundraising days remaining at time t for loan i.
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of contributing teams for loan i posted by
field partner j during time t-1.
The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of members in loan i’s contributing
teams at time t-1.
The natural logarithm of one plus the total amount loan i’s contributing teams had lent out
on Kiva during the month immediately preceding time t-1.
The natural logarithm of the number of days at time t-1 that field partner j had been posting
loans on Kiva.
The natural logarithm of one plus the total amount field partner j had raised on Kiva up
until time t-1.
Field partner j’s risk rating given by Kiva at time t-1; ranges from 0 to 5 with 5 being the
least risky.
The inverse Mills ratio for loan i from partner j at time t-1.
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5. Results
In this section, we first report our results of the first
stage random effects Probit selection model, then we
report the results of our second stage multilevel mixedeffects model.

5.1. Random effects Probit selection model
results
Because
we
use
one-week-lagged
loan
characteristic variables to predict the likelihood that a
loan had at least one contributing team by time t, our
sample size reduces to 42,286 loan-week pairs collected
from 20,250 unique loans. Table 3 summarizes the
results of our first stage random effects Probit selection
model. Except for DummyPtr, all other independent
variables are significant. The results indicate that having
a higher fundraising goal and more borrowers on the
loan increased the likelihood of the loan having at least
one contributing team. In contrast, loans that were early
in their fundraising process with more days remaining
were less likely to have a contributing team. Based on
the estimation model, we calculate the IMR and add it
to our second stage multilevel mixed-effects model.
Table 3. Random effects Probit selection model
results (N=42,286)
Variable
ln(LoanGoali+1)
NoBorrowersi
DummyPtri
DaysLeftijt-1
Sector Dummies
Country Dummies
Time Dummies
Constant
Wald χ2
*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Coefficient
(Std. Dev.)
1.775***
(0.074)
0.179***
(0.014)
5.968
(4.746)
-0.458***
(0.005)
Included
Included
Included
-0.410
(4.825)
18061.89***

5.2. Multilevel mixed-effects model results
Table 4 summarizes our second-stage analysis
results from multiple models. Model 2A is the baseline
model without considering the nested field partner
effect. Models 2B through 2E are multilevel mixed
effects models that take into account the nested field
partner effect on loan success. Model 2B includes the
intercept only. Model 2C includes Level 1 loan fixed

and random effects only. Model 2D includes Level 2
field partner and random effects only. Model 2E
includes fixed and random effects for both the loan and
field partner variables. Models 2B and 2D have much
larger sample sizes because there is no selection bias of
loans with contributing teams. In the other three models,
we control for this selection bias by including the
inverse Mills ratio for having a team. All models’
variance inflation factors (VIFs) are under 5. As a result,
multicollinearity is not an issue in our data analysis. We
compare the model goodness of fit using the deviance
[32, 33]. Because Models 2B and 2D have much larger
sample sizes, their deviances are much larger. Overall,
Model 2E with the fixed and random effects of both loan
and partner level variables has the lowest deviance and
the best model fit.
Overall, our fixed effects coefficient estimates are
consistent across the five models. At the loan level, the
coefficient estimate for ln(TtlAmtRcvdijt-1+1) is negative
and significant in Models 2A, 2C and 2E, while the
coefficient for DaysLeftijt-1 is positive and significant in
these three models. For lending team-related variables,
the coefficient estimates for ln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) and
ln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1) are positive and significant in
Models 2A, 2C and 2E, indicating that having more
contributing teams and having contributing teams with
more members led to more funding received in the next
week. Contrary to our expectation, the coefficient for
ln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) is negative and significant
across all three models. This shows that having
contributing teams with more dollar amount lent in the
previous month resulted in less funding received during
the next week. The inverse Mills ratio for controlling the
team selection bias is negative and significant in all
three models.
At the field partner level, the coefficient estimate for
PtrRatingjt-1 is negative and either significant or weakly
significant in Models 2A, 2D and 2E. This contradicts
H1c and indicates that loans with more risky field
partners were able to obtain more funding during the
next period. The coefficient estimate for ln(PtrTenurejt1) is positive and significant in Model 2A but not in
Models 2D and 2E. The coefficient estimate for
ln(PtrTtlAmtRaisedjt-1 +1) is negative across the three
models but only significant or weakly significant in
Models 2A and 2D.
By comparing the deviances and the significance of
the random coefficients of the models, we can see that
adding the field partner level into the data analysis
provides additional explanatory power beyond that
provided by the loan-level variables or the fixed effects.
Based on the results from the unconditional Model 2B,
we calculate the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient
(ICC) as σ2ξ0j / (σ2ξ0j + σ2ε) = 37%. This reveals that 37%
of the total variation in ln(LoanAmtRcvdijt+1) can be
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explained by the field partners. In Models 2C and 2E,
the random coefficients for ln(TtlAmtRcvdijt-1+1),
DaysLeftijt-1 and ln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) are significant,
while those for ln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) are weakly
significant. Hence, the impacts of these loan-level

variables vary across field partners. Taken together,
these results suggest the importance of incorporating the
field partner as an additional level of analysis when
examining loan contribution on Kiva.

Table 4. Results of baseline and multilevel mixed-effects models
Model 2A
(Baseline
model)
Fixed effects
Intercept (γ00)
ln(PtrTenurejt-1) (γ01)
ln(PtrTtlAmtRaisedjt-1+1) (γ02)
PtrRatingjt-1 (γ03)
ln(TtlAmtRcvdijt-1+1) (γ10)
DaysLeftijt-1 (γ20)
ln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) (γ30)
ln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1) (γ40)
ln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) (γ50)
IMR i,t-1 (β6)
Time dummies
Random effects
Intercept (σ2ξ0j)

1.2247***
(0.2296)
0.1778***
(0.0366)
-0.0178
(0.0200)
-0.1493***
(0.0170)
-0.3922***
(0.0092)
0.0459***
(0.0023)
2.2992***
(0.0296)
0.0385***
(0.0087)
-0.0792***
(0.0112)
-0.1918***
(0.0071)
Included

Multilevel Mixed Effects Models
Model 2B
(Intercepts
only)

Model 2C
(Level 1 only)

Model 2D
(Level 2 only)

Model 2E
(Both Level 1
and Level 2)

4.8691***
(0.1404)

2.5098***
(0.0917)

8.8120***
(1.0667)
0.2823
(0.2905)
-0.3595**
(0.1413)
-0.3958***
(0.1327)

Included

-0.3420***
(0.0130)
0.02309***
(0.0031)
2.0342***
(0.0363)
0.0400***
(0.0091)
-0.0678***
(0.0117)
-0.0977***
(0.0114)
Included

3.5449***
(0.6581)
-0.0956
(0.1337)
0.0206
(0.0720)
-0.1763***
(0.0630)
-0.3476***
(0.0135)
0.0271***
(0.0033)
2.0222***
(0.0388)
0.0384***
(0.0092)
-0.0683***
(0.0117)
-0.0928***
(0.0116)
Included

2.4856***
(0.3293)

Included
2.0397***
(0.2825)

ln(TtlAmtRcvdijt-1+1) (σ2ξ1j)

0.0066***
(0.0015)
0.0003***
DaysLeftijt-1 (σ2ξ2j)
(0.0001)
0.0172**
ln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) (σ2ξ3j)
(0.0079)
0.0003
ln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1) (σ2ξ4j)
(0.0002)
0.0005*
ln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) (σ2ξ5j)
(0.0003)
Residual (σ2ε)
4.2335***
2.9727***
(0.0281)
(0.0296)
N
20,596
45,434
20,779
Deviance
812,162.7
195,072.7
82,030.3
Notes: The standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

5.3. Robustness checks
We perform four robustness checks on our data
analysis. First, because we are unable to include the
number of lenders as an independent variable due to
its high correlation with the cumulative amount raised,

4.2369***
(0.0282)
45,211
194,144.5

0.0501*
(0.0331)
0.0070***
(0.0016)
0.0003***
(0.0001)
0.0264***
(0.0108)
0.0003
(0.0003)
0.0004*
(0.0003)
2.9693***
(0.0300)
20,596
81,318.4

we test additional models by replacing the cumulative
amount raised with the number of lenders. We obtain
very similar results to those report in Table 4 in terms
of coefficient estimates and significance levels.
Second, in addition to examining the impacts of
the field partner and contributing teams on the amount
of funding received, we also test additional models
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using the percentage of the loan received during a
week as the dependent variable and the cumulative
percentage of loan received up to the previous week as
one of the independent variables. We also obtain
results very similar to those reported in Table 4.
Third, we replaced the dummy variable indicating
the presence of a field partner with three field partner
statistics including tenure, amount of loan raised, and
rating in the first-stage selection model to account for
the impact of field partners on the likelihood of a loan
having at least one lending team. Our results from the
second-stage multilevel mixed-effects model have the
same signs for the coefficient estimates with similar
magnitudes and significance levels.
Fourth, because 98.5% of our sample loans
involved a field partner, we are unable to run a
Heckman selection model on the field partner due to
the lack of enough variation. A closer examination of
the data shows that the lack of a field partner is for
U.S. borrowers only. We do not consider this to be a
serious issue for two reasons. First, the U.S. is the only
developed country where Kiva lenders lend to.
Because Kiva lenders do not get any interest on their
loans to the borrowers and they primarily lend to
borrowers in developing countries for altruistic
reasons, loans from U.S. lenders may perform
systematically different from those with borrowers in
developing countries as the underlying drivers may be
different. Second, our second-stage multilevel analysis
accounts for the fixed loan effect where the impacts of
loan-invariant variables such as goal amount, country
and sector are controlled.

6. Discussion
6.1. Theoretical contribution
We examine how two different types of
transaction-based event-type social networks on P2P
lending platform Kiva function differently as pipes
and prisms to affect fundraising success. We have the
following major results and contribution.
First, we extend the crowdfunding literature by
examining the impacts of event-type social networks.
The extant crowdfunding literature has recognized the
importance of borrowers’ and lenders’ social networks
on crowdfunding success. However, the focus has
been on more permanent state-type social networks
such as friendship networks [4, 5]. In the current
research, we study more temporary event-type ties that
develop based on business transactions between the
borrowers and field partners and between the
borrowers and their contributing teams and the
impacts of such event-type ties on crowdfunding.

Second, our research contributes to the
crowdfunding and social network literature by
highlighting the different mechanisms through which
social networks can influence crowdfunding success.
While both borrower-partner and borrower-team
networks are event-type networks, our theorizing and
results show that the borrower-team networks function
as pipes that facilitate the flow of information and
prospective lenders from a lending team to the loan
page, and borrower-partner ties serve as prisms that
signal the pressing financial need of the borrowers.
Third, our results reveal the importance of
contributing teams to the success of a Kiva loan.
Specifically, having a larger number of contributing
teams and more members in these teams result in more
contribution received in the next period. The fact that
not only the total number of contributing teams but
also the total number of members in these teams affect
fundraising success also confirms our hypothesis that
the borrower-team ties serve as pipes that funnel more
prospective lenders from the contributing teams’
webpages to a loan’s webpage, build up awareness,
and result in more fundraising success. The team
webpage serves as an online community for Kiva
lenders with similar lending interests, shared identity
or affiliation, or close geographic proximity.
Empirical research shows that online communities
foster members’ identification with and commitment
to the community and social media platform, thus
resulting in more active member participation. On
Kiva, members of a lending team can interact with
each other through the team’s discussion forum,
review other team members’ lending activities, and
discover loans other team members have contributed
to. This makes finding more information about a
particular loan much easier given the large number of
concurrent loans on Kiva. Contrary to our expectation,
the total amount of contributing team loans in the last
month is negatively correlated with a loan’s
fundraising success. There are two possible
explanations, First, this can be indicative of the limited
financial resources available to Kiva lenders. As the
lenders contribute more to other loans in the
immediate past, they have less financial resource to
lend to the current borrowers. Second, when team
members contributed more in the last months, more
loans will show on the team’s homepage, thus giving
other team members more options to choose from.
This intensified competition among loans may result
in reduced loan contribution in the next period.
Fourth, our research highlights a different
mechanism through which the borrower-partner ties
affect fundraising success. Contrary to our
expectation, field partner rating is negatively
correlated with loan success. This suggests that, while
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lenders take the field partner’s risk rating into
consideration in their lending decisions, they do not
interpret it as a signal of the borrower(s)’ more
desirable or trustworthy status. In contrast, a loan with
a riskier field partner is perceived more favorably by
lenders. We interpret this as another prism effect
where altruistic lenders view more risky field partners
as indicative of borrowers with more significant
financial needs. Because Kiva lenders do not receive
any interest on their loans and run the risk of not
getting their loans back, they lend to borrowers from
developing countries with the goal to help others
rather than making a profit on their investment. As a
result, the field partner’s risk rating is not factored
negatively into the lenders’ decision making process.
Fifth, we confirm a substitution effect observed in
prior crowdfunding research where prospective
lenders favor loans with less contribution [11] and
observe that Kiva loans receive more contribution
early in their fundraising process.
Sixth, our multilevel mixed effects model results
reveal the importance of considering the field partner
as an additional level of analysis beyond the loan.
Specifically, the field partner explains 37% of the total
variation in the natural log of the loan contribution
during a week. Moreover, there is significant variation
in the impacts of loan-level variables such as the total
contribution received, days left, the total number of
contributing teams, and the amount of loan made by
the contributing teams in the previous month among
loans sponsored by different field partners.

Second, our results suggest that, depending on the
function and goal of a crowdfunding platform, the
factors that affect lending behavior and crowdfunding
success will be different. For example, contrary to our
expectation, loans associated with more risky field
partners are perceived more favorably by Kiva
lenders. Hence, when designing crowdfunding
platforms, the providers should consider the market
they serve and the characteristics of their prospective
lenders. For donation-based crowdfunding platform,
the emphasis should be more on the emotional aspects
of helping others and making a difference in their
lives. In contrast, in profit-driven P2P lending or
equity-based crowdfunding, the emphasis should be
more on the return on investment and risks involved.
Third, due to the prevalence of the substitution
effect observed in multiple crowdfunding studies
including the current one, crowdfunding platforms
should consider strategies to enhance contribution to
late-stage fundraising projects to ensure fundraising
success. This is especially important for platforms
employing the all-or-nothing model where borrowers
do not receive anything if they do not reach the
fundraising goal by the end of the fundraising period.
Strategies that can be employed include listing more
active and close to fundraising goal projects on the
platform’s or each category/subcategory’s front page
and engaging in email marketing campaigns alerting
members of such projects.

6.2. Practical implications

The current research examines how two types of
transaction-based event-type ties on Kiva contribute
differently to crowdfunding success. Our empirical
research using a multilevel mixed effects model
reveals that borrower-team ties function as pipes that
facilitate the flow of information and prospective
lenders to a loan’s page, while borrower-partner ties
serve as prisms that signal the urgency of the
borrowers’ financial need.
Our research has limitations. First, our results on
two different types of event-type social networks are
based on one P2P lending platform only. Future
research can examine other event-type ties and how
they affect crowdfunding success on other platforms.
Second, while we observe the significance of the
borrower-team and borrower-partner relationships to
fundraising success on Kiva, we cannot infer causality
as we do not test lenders’ decision making directly. We
plan to conduct additional analyses on how the number
of current lenders on a loan from one team affect the
number of new lenders from the same team. Future
research can verify the impacts of such ties using
laboratory experiments.

Our research has the following implications for
crowdfunding platforms in general and P2P lending
providers in particular. First, our results highlight the
importance of using lending teams to build
communities of online lenders, encourage more active
lender participation, and enhance fundraising success.
Multiple studies have confirmed the significance of
online communities in enhancing website stickiness.
While many crowdfunding platforms allow users to
post comments under a crowdfunding project, few
supports online communities on their platforms. The
project comment section only supports limited
interaction among the users and requires them to first
become aware of a particular fundraising project. In
contrast, an online lending team on Kiva allows team
members to post to the team’s discussion forum,
interact with each other, and discover other
fundraising loans. The sense of community and the
commitment to the team and to Kiva will lead to more
team member lending behavior.

7. Conclusion
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